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PEERING INTO THE BEDROOMS OF THE PROVINCE:

AN EXAMINATION OF THE DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS
OF "SPOUSE" IN THE FAMILY LAWACT AND THE
ONTARIO WORKS AcT, 1997
TAMARA D. BARCLAY*

RkSUMt
Cet article analyse les definitions du terme ' conjoint o pr~sentes dans la Loi sur le
droit de lafamille et dans les r~glements pris en application de la Loi de 1997 sur le
programme Ontario au travail.Apr s avoir pass6 en revue le contexte 16gislatif de
chaque d6finition, 1'article analyse 1'argumentation a laquelle le procureur g6n6ral de
l'Ontario a eu recours r6cemment lors de deux contestations constitutionnelles relativement Aces d6fmitions : M. c. H. (contestation de la d6finition contenue dans la Loi
sur le droit de la famille) et Falkinerc. Directeur,Direction du maintien du revenu,
ministre des Services sociaux et communautaires(contestation de la d6f'mition dans
la Loi sur les prestationsfamiliales, identique en substance A la d6finition contenue
dans la Loi de 1997 sur le programme Ontarioau travail). Selon l'auteure, les deux
d6finitions de < conjoint et de nombreux arguments du gouvernement reposent sur
une conception fonctionnelle de la famille dans laquelle il est sous-entendu que les
r6les assign6s A chacun des sexes sont stricts. Comme l'auteure l'indique en faisant
r6f6rence aux situations factuelles qui sous-tendent ce type de causes, ce concept de
famille ne correspond pas aux r6alit6s de la vie quotidienne. Bien que les d6finitions
partagent ce fondement de conception fonctionnelle et certaines caract6ristiques (les
deux sont h6t6rosexistes, par exemple), elles different sur de nombreux points.
L'auteure remet en question les arguments propos6s par le gouvernement pour d6fendre ces diff6rences et r6v~le les incoh6rences, voire les contradictions, de la position
adopt6e par le gouvernement dans les deux 6crits 16gislatifs.

*

Tamara D. Barclay, Associate, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. An earlier version of this paper was
written for Professor Mary Jane Mossman at Osgoode Hall Law School. As always, I remain
indebted to Professor Mossman for her never-ending encouragement and support.
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INTRODUCTION
Unless we start to make family law connect with how people really
1
live, the law is either largely irrelevant or merely ideology.
And so, almost a decade ago, Martha Minow fingered exactly what remains wrong
with laws affecting families (still) today. One only needs to look so far as definitions
and concepts of spouse for an apt illustration: although there have been many recent
debates over, and changes to, the definition of "spouse" - and who is to be included
in the definition - the latest editions of Black's Law Dictionary and the Oxford English
Dictionary both steadfastly profess "spouse" to mean, simply and traditionally, a
"husband or wife". Over the last quarter century, Canada has seen numerous challenges
to this traditional definition. No longer does the word at law apply only to a man and
a woman who are legally married. 2 Rather, the law also recognizes as spouses
opposite-sex couples who live "common-law", and there is an undeniable movement
across Canada towards also recognising cohabiting same-sex couples as "commonlaw partners", a category once reserved only for opposite-sex couples. 3 With each of
these movements away from "tradition" there has been resistance within society: any
change to the law has social, financial, and political ramifications attached to it, and
changes to who we consider to be a "spouse" or in a "spouse-like" relationship is no
different. Many people are wary or downright opposed to change, particularly when
it involves something as deep-rooted in society as the institution of family or marriage.
However, change is inevitable. Two examples of "spousal changes" in North America
are the recent legislative and judicial activity in British Columbia and Hawaii: in 1998,
British Columbia became the first jurisdiction in Canada to extend to same-sex couples
all the same rights and responsibilities as opposite-sex couples in relation to support,
child custody and access; 4 in 1996, Hawaii became the first jurisdiction in the United

1.
2.

3.

4.

M. Minow, "Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?" (1991) 62 Univ. Colorado Law Rev.
269 at 271.
The Ontario Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, for instance, is an example of provincial legislation that currently recognizes, for some purposes, heterosexual cohabiting unmarried couples as
"spouses".
Over the last decade there have been many cases, not all successful, in which the definition of spouse
was challenged by gay or lesbian couples. A few of the most recent include: Rosenberg v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1998] O.J. No. 1627, 158 D.L.R. (41h ) 664 (Ont. C.A.) [where the Court
unanimously held that the opposite-sex only pension survivor benefits were discriminatory]; and
(1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 612 (Gen. Div.) [where the Court held that if there was discrimination, it was
justified under s.l of the Charter]; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609;
C.E.G. (No. 1) (Re), [1995] O.J. No 4072 (Gen. Div., Am. Ct.); C.E.G. (No. 2) (Re), [1995] O.J. No.
4073 (Gen. Div., Fam. Ct.); Canada (AG) v. Moore, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1139 (T.D.); Taylor v. Rossu
h)
(1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 562, 191 A.R. 252 (Alta. Q.B.); Vogel v. Manitoba (1995), 126 D.L.R. (41
72, [1995] 6 W.W.R. 513 (Man C.A.). For the most recent American case on this issue, see Baker v.
State (Vt.), Vermont Supreme Court, December 20, 1999 (Unreported), where the Vermont Supreme
Court determined that the Vermont marriage laws which prohibit the issuance of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was a violation of Vermont's Constitution.
See Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 as am. by Family Relations Amendment Act, 1997
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States to recognize same-sex marriages - a decision which resulted in the hasty
enactment of federal legislation providing other states with the right to refuse to
recognize for legal purposes a same-sex couple married in Hawaii. 5
Given that who is a spouse strikes at the very heart of family life, it is surprising to
see the definition of "spouse" vary from one legislative context to another within a
single jurisdiction. Ontario is such ajurisdiction. The provincial Family Law Act 6 and
the Ontario Works Act, 19977 are examples of such legislation.
My intention is to look critically at the definitions of spouse in the Family Law Act
and the Ontario Works Act, 1997, and explore some of the arguments and policy
justifications made by the present provincial government for the current and differing
definitions of spouse. More specifically, I will examine how the current provincial
government has used recent litigation to advance its functionalist approach to family
law and spouses, and to maintain its policy decisions on the different definitions of
spouse in the FLA and the OWA, despite social and family realities that call for change.
The task will be completed in four sections. In section one, I will outline and discuss
the current definitions of "spouse" and the legislative history of each definition. In
order to illustrate how the definition of "spouse" affects "real life situations", I intend
to use two cases: M. v. H.8 which challenged the definition of spouse in the FLA, and
Falkinerv. Ontario9 which challenged the definition in (what is now) the OWA.1O
Section two will outline the facts and ultimate decision in each case, while section
three will provide an overview of governmental policies and to what ends they were
invoked in these cases. Finally, in section four, I shall critique the policies behind the
definitions, ultimately questioning the appropriateness of, and the motivations behind,
these inconsistent definitions.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

(proclaimed 4 February 1998); and Family MaintenanceEnforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.127 as
amended by Family MaintenanceEnforcement Amendment Act, 1997 (proclaimed 4 February 1998).
See Baehr v. Miike, 80 Haw. 341, 910 P 2d. 112 (1996) (Hawaii S.C.); and the Defense of Marriage
Act, s.1738C, amending Chapter 115 of title 28 of the United States Code, and s.7 amending Chapter
1 of title 1 of the United States Code.
R.S.O., 1990, c.F.3 [hereinafter, "FLA"].
S.O. 1997, c. 25, Schedule A [hereinafter, OWA].
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 171 D.L.R. (4th ) 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter, M. v. H., S.C.C. cited to D.L.R.].
Falkinerv. Director,Income Maintenance Branch, Ministry of Community and Social Services et.
al. (SARB Decision of the Constitutional Challenge, August 13, 1998) [hereinafter Falkiner,

SARBI.
10.

At the time the Falkiner challenge began, the legislation dealing with social assistance were the
Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.2 [hereinafter the FBA] and the General Welfare Assistance
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.G.6 [hereinafter the GWAA]. Since this time, however, the FBA and the GWAA
have been repealed and the Ontario Works Legislation, 1997, supra note 7, enacted in its place.
Although many differences exist between the two acts, the wording of the Regulatory definition of
spouse for the purposes of support remained, for all practical purposes, the same. Although the FBA
and the GWAA were in force when the Falkinerlitigation began, for the purposes of this paper I have
referred to the OWA.
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DEFINING "SPOUSE": THE LEGISLATION
The Family Law Act
The predecessor to the Family Law Act was the Family Law Reform Act. 11 This Act

was first introduced in 1976 by the (then) Attorney General of Ontario, the Hon. R.
Roy McMurtry. The FLRA was intended to answer the public's demands in the late
1960s and early 1970s to re-organize existing property law upon marriage breakdown,
and to change the regulation of the rights and obligations of family members. 12 The
objectives of the FLRA as stated in the Preamble to the Act included: the desire to
encourage and strengthen the role of the family in society; the recognition of the equal
position of spouses as individuals within marriage and of marriage as a form of
partnership; the desire to provide for the orderly and equitable settlement of the affairs
of the spouses upon the breakdown of the partnership; and the desire to provide for
other mutual obligations in family relationships, including the equitable sharing by
parents of responsibility for their children. 13 In addition to addressing these concerns
with respect to married spouses, the FLRA became the first Canadian statute to extend
support rights and obligations to unmarried heterosexual couples. While certain rights
were reserved for married couples alone, for purposes of support, the FLRA broadened
the definition of "spouse" and proclaimed a spouse to be a "party to a valid, void or
voidable marriage" or either of a man and a woman who had cohabited continuously
for at least five years, or a man and a woman who were in a relationship of some
14
permanence where they were the natural parents of a child.
The decision to include "common-law" couples in the definition of spouse was
controversial: many common-law couples criticized the move, stating that they had
chosen not to marry in order to escape the confines and obligations of legal marriage;
other members of the public criticized the definition as attacking the traditional
family. 15 The provincial government stated publicly that its decision to extend the
definition of spouse to non-married [heterosexual] couples was based on the fact that
women in common-law relationships, like women in married relationships, tended to
become financially dependent on their male partners due to their child-rearing activities and unequal earning power. The Attorney General also explained that the move
was an attempt by the government to reduce the increasing demands on the welfare
system which had resulted from some men's abandonment of their common-law
16
spouses and the children of these relationships.

11.
12.

Family Law Reform Act, S.O. 1978, c.2, [hereinafter the FLRA].
The enactment of the FLRA followed the controversial Supreme Court of Canada decision in Murdoch v.
Murdoch, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367 (S.C.C.). While the majority of the Supreme Court
there held that a resulting trust could not be applied in favour of Mrs. Murdoch in recognition of her
contribution to the family ranch, the decision provided a catalyst for reform across Canada.

13.

FLRA, Preamble.

14.

FLRA, ss. 1, 14(b).

15.

Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at 4793 (18 November 1976) (Statement by the Hon. R.
McMurtry).

16.

Ibid.
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In March 1986, the FLRA was replaced by the Family Law Act. 17 Although the FLA
included only heterosexual couples within its protections and obligations, and continued to distinguish married and non-married couples, among the changes the new Act
brought to Ontario family law was an amendment to the definition of spouse for the
purposes of support. Section 29 of the FLA shortened the period of cohabitation
required for spousal status from five years to three, and amended the parent stipulation
to include men and women who were the adoptive parents of a child. In the same year,
the Ontario legislature also amended many other provincial statutes in order to confer
the same rights and responsibilities on common-law spouses as applied in respect of
married spouses. 18 Among the reasons given by the government for this change was
the desire to employ a "uniform definition" of spouse throughout provincial law. 19
Thus, until recently, for the purposes of support, spouse was defined in section 29 as
a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1) [party to a valid, void, or voidable marriage],
and in addition includes either of a man and woman who are not married to each
other and have cohabited,
(a)
(b)

continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child. 20

This definition remained unchanged from the 1986 introduction of the FLA until
November, 1999. In November, 1999 the current provincial government enacted
changes to section 29 of the FLA2 1in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in M v.
H. that the definition was an unjustifiable infringement on the rights guaranteed in
section 15 of the Charter. The legislation, entitled Amendments Because of the
Supreme Court of CanadaDecision in M. v. H. Act, 1999,22 amended section 29 of
the FLA by adding the following definition:
"same-sex partner" means either of two persons of the same sex who have cohabited,
continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.
As a result of this amendment, same-sex partners will have the same support rights
and obligations as common-law spouses.
(1)
(2)

17.

Family Law Act, S.O. 1986, c. 4.

18.
19.

M. v. H., S.C.C., supra note 8, Factum of the Attorney General, para. 23.
See above, note 14, and additionally, M. v. H., S.C.C. supra note 8 (Factum of the Attorney General,
para. 24).
FLA, s.29.
The Act also amended various other statutes in the same manner.
S.O. 1999, c.6. The Act received first, second, and third reading on October 27, 1999. It received
Royal Assent on October 28, 1999. Those provisions which amended the definition in the FLA came
into force on November 20,1999 (thus meeting the six month deadline given by the Supreme Court
of Canada). Several other provisions came into force on March 1, 2000.

20.
21.
22.
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As might be surmised by the title of the new Act, the government did not willingly
change the definition. In a News Release from the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
General of October 25, 1999, Attorney General Jim Flaherty stated
[t]his legislation is clearly not part of our agenda. The only reason we are introducing this Bill [Bill 5] is because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision. We would
not introduce the legislation otherwise.
Our proposed legislation complies with the decision while preserving the traditional
23
values of the family by protecting the definition of spouse in Ontario law.

In the Fact Sheet given to the media by the Ontario Government, the Ministry of the
Attorney General stated that the amendments will
...
[introduce] into the law a new term, "same sex partner", while at the same time
protecting the traditional definition of spouse.... The rights and obligations that are
unique to married couples are not being extended to same sex partners. ... The Bill
responds to the Supreme Court decision while preserving the traditional value of the
family in Ontario.... The Bill does not alter the traditional meaning of common-law
24
spouses in Ontario law."

The Ontario Works Act, 1997
The definition of "spouse" for the purposes of the OWA has seen numerous changes
since its initial enactment. At issue in the Falkiner litigation were Regulations that
defined a "spouse" as
(1)

23.

24.

(a)

a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who together
with the applicant or recipient have declared to the administrator that
they are spouses,

News Release re Bill 5, October 25, 1999. Quicklaw, database OB99, document 802. Interestingly,
in May 1994, the (then) NDP Ontario Govemment introduced Bill 167 - "The Equality Rights
Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994" - which would have extended the definition of spouse in
Ontario to include same-sex couples. The controversial Bill followed on the footsteps of a 1993
Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) Report on the rights and responsibilities of cohabitants
under the FLA. The Report recommended setting up a system of registered domestic partnerships in
order to give same-sex couples the same rights and obligations afforded to married persons throughout the FLA. While the Law Commission wanted more information about the attitudes and expectations of cohabiting same-sex couples on the issue, the Commission reported that it saw "much merit
in treating [same-sex cohabiting couples] in the same way [as opposite-sex cohabiting couples] - so
that economic inequalities and exploitation will be minimized in all familial relationships." In writing Bill 167 the provincial government adopted and expanded the OLRC recommendations. The Bill
would have redefined "spouse" in 57 Ontario statutes - including the FLA - extending the
definition so as to include same-sex couples. However, in June 1994, Bill 167 was defeated on a free
vote at second reading, by a margin of 68:59. Further, in February, 2000, the Federal Government
tabled Bill c-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, (First Reading February 11,
2000) in the Commons which, if passed, will change 68 federal statutes (including tax, pension and
bankruptcy laws) that mention couples. While "spouse" would still refer only to opposite-sex couples,
"common-law partners" would apply equally to both heterosexual and homosexual relationships.
News Release re Bill 5, October 25, 1999. Quicklaw, database OB99, document 802.
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(b)

a person who is required under a court order or domestic contract to support the applicant or recipient or any of his or her dependants,

(c)

a person who has an obligation to support the applicant or recipient or
any of his or her dependants under section 30 or 31 of the FamilyLaw
Act whether or not there is a domestic contract or other agreement
between the person and the applicant or recipient whereby they purport
to waive or release such obligation to support, or

(d)

subject to subsection (3), a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or
recipient who is residing in the same dwelling place as the applicant or
recipient if the social and familial aspects of the relationship between
the person and the applicant or recipient amount to cohabitation and,

the person is providing financial support to the applicant or recipient,
(ii) the applicant or recipient is providing financial support to the person, or
(iii) the person and the applicant or recipient have a mutual agreement
or arrangement regarding their financial affairs.
For the purposes of the definition of "spouse", sexual factors shall not be
investigated or considered in determining whether or not a person is a spouse.
For the purpose of clause (d) of the definition of "spouse", unless the applicant or recipient provides evidence to satisfy the administrator to the contrary, it is presumed that if a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or
recipient is residing in the same dwelling place as the applicant or recipient,
25
the person is the spouse of the applicant or recipient.
(i)

(2)
(3)

Thus, subsection (3) provided that any time two opposite-sex individuals lived
together, they were presumed to be spouses from the moment the co-residency began,
unless they could "satisfy the administrator to the contrary".
In the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in M. v. H., the regulations to
the OWA were amended to create a new category of "same-sex partner". The above
noted definition of "spouse" was also amended to no longer refer simply to "a person"
in clauses (b), (c), and (d) but to "a person of the opposite sex to the Applicant or
Recipient". Significantly, the presumption of a spousal relationship upon residing in
26
the same dwelling created by subsection 1(3) was repealed.
25.
26.

0. Reg. 134/98, s. 1(1).
0. Reg. 32/00. The Regulation amends subsection 1(1) by adding the following definition:
"Same-sex partner", in relation to an applicant or recipient, means,
(1) a person of the same sex as the applicant or recipient, if the person and the applicant
or recipient have together declared to the administrator or to the Director under the
OntarioDisabilitySupport ProgramAct, 1997 that they are same-sex partners,
(2) a person of the same sex as the applicant or recipient who is required under a court
order or domestic contract to support the applicant or recipient or any of his or her dependants,
(3) a person of the same sex as the applicant or recipient who has an obligation to support
the applicant or recipient or any of his or her dependants under section 30 or 31 of the
Family Law Act, whether or not there is a domestic contract or other agreement
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Like the spousal definition in the FLA, the definition of "spouse" in the OWA
Regulations has been socially and politically charged. As Margaret Hillyard Little and
Ian Morrison argue
[t]he history of how the welfare system has treated the definition of "family" and
poor women's relationships with men clearly reflects the entanglement of the issues
of economic need and moral worthiness. Throughout the history of this policy the
mothers and yet
state has always been concerned about how to provide aid to single
27
ensure that the policy did not promote this "deviant family form".
In 1920, the first formal state organized social assistance program in Ontario, the
OntarioMothers'Allowance Act, was passed. 28 The program allowed a single mother
who was a "fit and proper person", and who was morally deserving and in economic
need, to receive government support. The "notion of deservedness was broad, encom'29
passing almost all aspects of a mother's life including her associations with men."
Although the original Act permitted case workers to examine almost every aspect of
a recipient's life, the factors considered were later narrowed to financial honesty and
30
sexual conduct.
In 1968 OntarioMothers'Allowance Act was repealed, and the Family Benefits Act
enacted. While the new Act removed the explicit moral test of "fit and proper" person,
women could still only be eligible for assistance if they were single and not living
with someone as husband and wife. Hence the "man in the house" or "spouse in the
house" rule was born. As a result of this requirement, welfare investigators would go
to extraordinary lengths to determine whether a female recipient was sexually
involved with a man. As Little and Morrison report, "[tihis zeal to uncover
implications of sexual contact suggests that the more overt moralization of the 'fit and
proper person' standard continued into welfare administration long after its formal
repeal." 3 1 The rule also led to much resistance. Those who were opposed to the
provision criticised it for being discriminatory against women, arbitrary and capricious, and unfair in its administration at both the delivery level and the appellate level.

27.

28.
29.
30.

31.

between the person and the applicant or recipient whereby they purport to waive or
release such obligation to support, or
(4) a person of the same sex as the applicant or recipient who is residing in the same
dwelling place as the applicant or recipient, if the social and familial aspects of the
relationship between the person and the applicant or recipient amount to cohabitation and,
(1) the person is providing financial support to the applicant or recipient,
(2) the applicant or recipient is providing financial support to the person, or
(3) the person and the applicant or recipient have a mutual agreement or
arrangement regarding their financial affairs.
M. Hillyard Little and I. Morrison, "'The Pecker Detectors are Back': Regulation of the family form
in Ontario welfare policy" (1999), 34:2 Journal of Canadian Studies 110 at 112 [hereinafter, "Little
and Morrison"].
S.O. 1920, c. 89.
Little and Morrison, supra note 27 at 113.
Ibid. at 114.

Ibid. at ll5.
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Additionally critics claimed that by requiring investigations into the cohabitation and
financial arrangements of applicants or recipients of social assistance, the definition
gave rise to invasions of privacy. 3 2 Recipients protested that the definition be taken
seriously, and that benefits "only be removed where a true marriage-like relationship
existed in the social, sexual and economic relationship of the man and woman
involved, and not just based on any suspicion of sexual contact." 3 3 Following the
proclamation of the Charterof Rights andFreedoms, test cases were launched against
the definition of spouse. However, these cases were never argued, for the Ontario
government changed the definition.
In 1986, following wide attack of the rule in the media and a thorough investigation
by the Social Assistance Review Committee, the government announced that the
"spouse in the house" rule would be abolished as of April 1, 1987. The government
proceeded to introduce a new regulatory definition of spouse that allowed a sole
support parent to remain eligible for public assistance if she resided with a man, so
long as the man did not provide economic support for her or her dependent children,
accept parental responsibility for the children, nor have a legal obligation to support
her or her dependent children. 34 Two other significant changes were also introduced
by the government. The first was that while economic support, and social and familial
elements were to be considered in assessing whether a spousal relationship existed,
the Ministry would no longer be permitted to investigate the sexual aspects of the
relationship. Second, cohabitational relationships would not be considered to be
"spousal" unless the parties had continuously cohabited for a period of not less than
three years. 35 The Minister in charge of the Act and the Attorney General stated that
this latter change was an intentional decision by the government in order to provide
that the definition of "spouse" in public assistance legislation be in line with the
definition in the FLA.36
This definition of spouse was in effect until October, 1995. In June, 1995 the current
Conservative provincial government took office, and in August, 1995 it announced
that changes to the definition of spouse for the purposes of social assistance legislation
would be made to the Regulations to the Family Benefits Act and the General Welfare
AssistanceAct. 3 7 Specifically, the government announced that increases in the use of

32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

For criticisms of the old definitions see: Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee on the
Spouse in the House Rule (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1987); J. Haddad, Sexism and Social Welfare
Policy: The Case of Family Benefits in Ontario(Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education,
1995); P. M. Evans, "Divided Citizenship? Gender, Income Security, and the Welfare State" in P. M.
Evans and G. R. Wekerle eds., Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
Little and Morrison, supra note 27 at 115.
Justice Rosenberg, writing in dissent in the Divisional Court's first decision in Falkiner,canvassed
the history of social assistance legislation and the definition of spouse: Falkinerv. Ontario (1996),
140 D.L.R. (41h ) 115,94 O.A.C. 109 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at 140 [hereinafter, "Falkiner,Ont. Div. Ct."].
Ibid. per Rosenberg J. commenting on a news release of Community and Social Services Minister,
John Sweeney, and the Attorney General, Ian Scott.
Ibid.

(2000) 15 Journalof Law and Social Policy

social assistance and the public money being used for that purpose, and the "unfairness" of the definition would result in the three year "grace period" 3 8 afforded to social
assistance recipients or applicants being abolished. 3 9 As a result of this change, if the
relationship between the applicant/recipient and a person of the opposite sex
"amounted to cohabitation" and either one provided support to the other or they had
a mutual agreement or arrangement with respect to their financial affairs, they were
deemed to be 'spouses' .40
The definitions of spouse in the FLA and the OWA, and the legislative history of each,
have been controversial. While it would be possible to provide a discussion and
critique based on an abstract analysis, the definitions and their effects become more
poignant when discussed in view of their real life effects. To explore the differences
and similarities between the definitions and to critique the underlying policy behind
the government's defence of them, the cases of M. v. H. and Falkinerv. Ontario,both
cases challenging the definition of spouse, provide telling examples.
THE CASES: AN OVERVIEW
M. v. H.
M. and H. are lesbians who lived together in a stable, conjugal, spouse-like relationship for ten years before their separation in September, 1992. The separation was not
amicable, and the parties did not divide their personal property or household contents.
In October, 1992, M. brought an application for periodic financial support from H.,
alleging that she had experienced financial difficulties since the separation which were
41
caused by her dependency on H. that was, at least in part, created by the relationship.
She also sought, inter alia, an order for partition and sale of the parties' house, and a
declaration that she was the beneficial owner of certain land and premises owned by
H. The difficulty arose however, because under the FLA M. could not claim spousal
support; she and H. did not fall under the definition of spouse in section 29 because
they were not a "man and a woman." Furthermore, there was not a separate contract
between M. and H. outlining that financial support be provided to one another in the
37.
38.

39.

40.

41.

Supra, note 10. These Acts, together, were the precursors to the Ontario Works Act, 1997.
So called by the current Ontario government in its Factum filed for the first Divisional Court hearing,
Falkiner, Ont. Div. Ct. supra, note 34 (Factum of the Attorney General at para. 47). Wherever
possible, I have attempted to extract the Ontario government's position and submissions from its
most recent factum, filed for the recent hearing before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice [hereinafter Falkiner,Ont. S.C.J.].
It is likely that to some degree the government was reacting to public opinion, and misperception,
about the provisions. As Little and Morrison argue, it is unlikely that many members of the public
knew about the three-year rule, but were perhaps aware of growing numbers of recipient women
living with men, and there were many complaints about this "abuse" which was seen to be "blatant
fraud and apparently condoned by the government" (Little and Morrison, supra note 27 at 116).
For the full text of the definition see the beginning of this section, 'The Ontario Works Act, 1997".
As noted earlier, the FBA and the GWAA were replaced in 1997 by the OWA; however, as noted
above, the Regulatory definition of spouse remained the same.
M. v. H. (1996), 17 R.F.L. (4th) 365 at 377, 132 D.L.R. (4th)538 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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event of a separation that the court could independently rule on.42 M. thus amended
her application in order to include a section 15(1) Charterchallenge to the definition
of spouse in section 29 of the FLA on the basis that the definition infringed the equality
rights guaranteed by section 15(1) the Charter.To back her argument, M. claimed that
she and H. had lived together in a relationship that "mirrored an opposite sex
common-law relationship". As opposite-sex common-law relationships are recognized under Part III of the FLA (the support provisions), M. claimed so too should
43
same-sex "common-law-type" relationships.
Supporting M.'s claim that she and H. had lived together as "spouses" was evidence
indicating that in many ways M. and H.'s relationship had resembled that of many
heterosexual common-law spouses. M. presented evidence that during the relationship, the two women shared almost every aspect of their lives with one another. For
instance, while the home they lived in during their relationship had been owned by H.
prior to their cohabitation, the two women shared their everyday living expenses. In
addition, the women were business partners and accumulated substantial business and
personal assets, including business and country properties which allowed them to
enjoy an affluent lifestyle and vacation several times a year. In 1985 M. and H. made
mutual wills. 4 4
Among their business ventures was an advertising business the two women incorporated together and which supplied them with their primary source of income during
the relationship. Initially, M. and H. both worked at this company, however over time
H. became more involved in the business and M. in domestic tasks, although each
woman continued to be an equal shareholder in the company despite M.'s lesser
45
involvement and less direct contribution to the company.
H. opposed M.'s claim. She disputed that she and M. had followed a "common-law
type" relationship and argued that support should not be granted. The Attorney General
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Even if there had existed a private contract between the two women, it is not certain whether a court
would uphold it. Section 52(l) of the FLA effectively disallows domestic contracts between couples
of the same sex. Furthermore, even if the women had set it up to be different from the "formula"
generally used for domestic contracts, as Professors Cossman and Ryder point out: "[t]here is a risk
that such contracts would be found to violate public policy, in the same way in which marriage
contracts, and cohabitation contracts between different-sex couples, were historically seen to violate
public policy": B. Cossman and B. Ryder, Gay, Lesbian and UnmarriedHeterosexual Couples and
the Family Law Act. Accommodating a Diversity of Family Forms, (Research paper prepared for the
Ontario Law Reform Commission, June 1993) 9 at 102.
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M. v. H., supra note 41 at 377.
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M. v. H., S.C.C., supra note 8 (Factum of M., para. 3).
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In many ways M. and H. did have what might be called a "traditional" familial arrangement, and thus
one which the provincial government has been willing, even eager, to recognize in opposite-sex
couples. That is, H. worked at the business and drew a salary from the parties' jointly incorporated
company; while M. occasionally helped out at the business, she received no financial compensation.
Furthermore, M. did the majority of household chores, including all the cooking and most of the
laundry. M. also took care of the maintenance of the home and all of the gardening (M v. H., S.C.C.,
supra note 8 (Factum of "M.", paras. 2-4).
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of Ontario intervened in the proceedings in support of H., and eventually claimed that
while the provision infringed section 15(1), it was saved under section 1 of the
Charter.4 6 The Ontario Court, General Division determined in 1996 that the definition
unjustifiably infringed section 15(1) of the Charter;4 7 in 1997 a 2 to 1 majority of the
Ontario Court of Appeal agreed. 4 8 Although M. and H. would later settle their dispute
privately, the Attorney General of Ontario sought and obtained leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
On May 20, 1999 the Supreme Court released its decision which, by an 8 to 1 majority,
upheld the decisions of the lower courts that section 29 unjustifiably breached section
15(1).49 Specifically, Justices Iacobucci and Cory, writing for the majority, held that
the definition of spouse in section 29 of the FLA violated the "human dignity of
individuals in same-sex relationships" and
[t]he exclusion of same-sex partners from the benefits of the spousal support
scheme implies that they are judged to be incapable of forming intimate relation50
ships of economic interdependence, without regard to their actual circumstances.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the infringement could not be justified under
section 1, because "there is no rational connection between the objectives of the
spousal support provisions and the means chosen to further this objective. 5 1 As a result
of the finding, the Supreme Court declared section 29 to be of no force and effect, but
suspended the application of the declaration for six months.
Falkiner v. Ministry of Community and Social Services
The Falkiner case involved section 15(1) and section 7 Charter challenges to the
definition of "spouse" in the then FBA. The applicants were four women who were
each living with their dependent children and with a man who was not the children's
father. As each of the four applicants had been abused by men before, they were each
wary about committing to a relationship, particularly a long-term one. They did not
consider their cohabitees to be their "spouse" and wished to maintain financial
independence from them while "trying out" cohabitation in order to assess the
relationship. Prior to October, 1995 each of the women was a recipient of social
assistance under the former FBA. When the new Regulations came into effect in
October 1995, the women had each been residing with the men in reliance on the prior
regulations which had defined "spouse", inter alia, as a person of the opposite sex
with whom the applicant or recipient had resided continuously for a period of not less
46.

When M. first initiated the claim, the NDP government was in power and intervened in support of
M's claim. However, following the change in government in 1995 from NDP to Conservative, the
Attorney General changed its position, removed its previous factum, and filed a new one with its
current claims.
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(1997), 142 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 31 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.), [hereinafter "M. v. H., Ont. C.A."].
M. v. H., S.C.C., supra note 8.
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than three years. Under the new Regulations the man with whom each of the women
was living was deemed to be their "spouse" and as a result the women immediately
lost the entitlement to receive, in their own right, Family Benefits for themselves and
their children. Furthermore, as the definition of "spouse" in the GWAA was identical
to that in the FBA, the applicants were also unable to receive benefits under the GWAA
52
as sole support parents.
The women initially brought an application to the Ontario Court, General Division
under the JudicialReview ProcedureAct 5 3 claiming that the October, 1995 Regulations were ultra vires the FBA, and additionally, that the Regulations infringed sections
7 and 15(1) of the Charter.At the time of the hearing of the application, the applicants
had each requested, but had not yet received, a review under section 13(5) of the FBA
of their termination of their benefits, by the Social Assistance Review Board.
The majority of the Court dismissed the application. Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice Borins held that the impugned Regulations were intra vires the FBA and the
GWAA because the Acts "expressly provide for the definition of eligible classes and
persons in need by regulation"and therefore, "Regulations 409/95 and 410/95 [now
Regulation 134/98 under the OWA] fall squarely within the ambit of authority delegated to the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council." 5 4 Further, the majority of the court did
not consider the section 7 and section 15(1) Charter claims. Borins J. held that the
challenge was premature because the review of the applicants' benefits by the SARB
had not been completed, and as such, the Court lacked a complete factual record, and
in particular a factual finding as to whether the applicants were "spouses".55 In concluding, Justice Borins stated that if the SARB restored the applicants' benefits, then the
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Under the legislative scheme as it existed in October, 1995, the applicants and their co-residents may
have been entitled to General Welfare Assistance if they and their co-residents fulfilled the eligibility
requirements and the co-resident was prepared to join with the applicant and sign the necessary
forms. However, each of the applicants was unwilling to do so because of practical and principled
reasons: each applicant wished to remain financially independent from men because of her own past
experiences; and each applicant believed that the Regulationswere discriminatory.
R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1.
Falkiner,Ont. Div. Ct., supra note 34 at 155 (emphasis in original) as per Rosenberg J. in minority,
but adopted by the majority.
Ibid. at 123. Mr. Justice Rosenberg in a minority decision determined that the applicants' Charter
challenges could and should be addressed prior to the decision of the SARB. With respect to section
7, Rosenberg J. found that section 7 was not infringed because there was no evidence that the
disallowance of benefits under the FBA deprived the recipients of economic rights fundamental to
life, liberty, and security of the person. However, Justice Rosenberg did find that the Regulations
infringed section 15(1) of the Charter.This infringement occurred specifically because the Regulations discriminated against single mothers on welfare and their children, and additionally, they
discriminated generally against women, as women are the vast majority of those who are affected by
the impugned Regulations. Justice Rosenberg further found that the infringement was not saved by
section 1 of the Charter: according to Justice Rosenberg, there is no rational connection between
co-habitation and support, and the question of co-habitation is irrelevant to need and support (at 164
and 175).

(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy

constitutional issue would be moot, however, if SARB did not, the applicants could
then appeal to the Divisional Court on any question that was not one of fact alone. 5 7
Thus, the Falkiner applicants next appeared before the SARB. In August, 1998, the
Board, by a 2 to 1 majority, released its decision holding that the Regulations
unjustifiably infringed both sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.5 8 With respect to
section 15(1), the majority determined that the definition of spouse discriminated
against sole support parents on social assistance. 5 9 With respect to section 7, the Board
determined that the definition of spouse breached section 7 as it violated the
applicants' security of the person by depriving them of their personal autonomy,
"including the freedom to co-reside with a person of the opposite sex, their freedom
to make decisions about their personal life-styles and intimate relationships and the
freedom to choose how best to provide a nurturing environment for their children." 6 0
The Board found a further violation of section 7 in that it infringed the applicants'
right to be free from state-imposed psychological stress.
They are subject to psychological stress because they are in a constant state of
uncertainty and fear, not knowing when they and their co-resident have become
"spouses" based on the definition. Psychological stress also arises when they are
torn between continuing an arrangement which may be of great psychological and

emotional benefit for themselves and their children and the ever-present risk that the
61
arrangement will result in the termination of social assistance.

The Board also concluded that these violations of section 7 were contrary to the
62
principles of fundamental justice, as the definition of spouse was overly broad.
Finally, the Board found that the Charterbreaches could not be saved by section 1.
Specifically, the Board held that the means used to achieve the definition's objectives
were not rationally connected to its purpose. Further, because the definition of spouse
was overbroad, it was contrary to the minimal impairment requirements under section
1, and the principles of fundamental justice required by section 7.63 ..
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Ibid. at 124-5. This case provides a clear example of how a law may be both intra vires and
unconstitutional at the same time. The division of powers allowed under the ConstitutionAct, 1867
provides for the different areas in which the federal and provincial governments may enact laws. The
Charterprovides that any law may be unconstitutional if it does not meet the requirements set out in
the Charter. Here, the court found that the Regulations were intra vires the province's power.
However, the applicants would have still been successful if the majority of the court had examined
the Charterissue, and found that sections 15 and 1 were breached.
The SARB also considered arguments regarding infringement of section 8 of the Charter,argued by
the intervenor Canadian Civil Liberties Association. The Board held that it did not have the jurisdiction to consider the intervenor's submissions as the applicants before the Board had not been
"searched" themselves, and as the intervenor did not have party status, it could not raise new issues:
Falkiner,SARB, supra note 9 at 54.
Falkiner,SARB, supra note 9 at 33.
Ibid. at 46.
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The government appealed the decision to the (now) Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
Although the arguments were heard by the Court in the Fall of 1999, no decision has
yet been rendered.
THE CASES: THE POLICY AT PLAY
While the courts in M. v. H. and Falkinerwere each working within different statutory
parameters, and the source of the support the women sought differed, in each case the
definition of "spouse" prevented the applicants from receiving the financial support
they sought. One reason why these cases are interesting, controversial, and of particular import, is that while the definition of "spouse" is different in each Act, in each
case the government argued from a traditional, functionalist approach in order to
justify the (differing) definitions of "spouse" in the Acts in question.
Before the courts in M. v. H., and before the Superior Court and the SARB tribunal in
Falkiner,the Ontario government provided extensive submissions in their facta with
respect to why any finding of a section 15(1) violation should be saved by section 1.
Section 1 of the Charterprovides that in certain circumstances a discriminatory law
may be justified. Specifically it "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society." 6 4 In the event that a Charterbreach is found, the onus
of proving that the breach "can be demonstrably justified" lies with the party seeking
to uphold the provision, and the submissions generally involve a discussion of the
government's policy decisions with respect to the Act in question. As the oral and
written arguments presented to the Courts provide many insights into the government's
policy decisions and justifications regarding challenged legislation, it is useful to
examine the arguments made by the provincial government in M. v. H. and in Falkiner
65
and how, if at all, the arguments affected the decisions.
M. v.H.:
When M. first initiated her Charter challenge to section 29 of the FLA, the (then)
Attorney General of Ontario intervened in support of her position: Ontario filed
affidavit evidence and a factum which argued that section 29 unjustifiably infringed
section 15(1), and additionally provided sociological evidence which supported
affording same-sex couples the same rights, privileges and benefits currently enjoyed
by opposite-sex couples. However, in 1995, following the change in provincial
governments and before the case was heard, the current Attorney General removed the
original factum it had filed with the court and submitted new arguments now claiming
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The CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
In examining the s.l arguments made by the government in M. v. H., I have relied on the factum
filed at the S.C.C. along with any mention by the S.C.C. of the arguments made before it. As noted
above, with respect to the government's arguments in Falkiner I have relied on the facta filed for
both the hearing before the Ontario Divisional Court, and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
Additionally, I have made use of any mention by the SARB of the arguments made before it.
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that while section 29 of the FLA is discriminatory, the breach can be "saved" by section
1.
In order to determine whether or not a discriminatory law may be "saved" by section
1 of the Charter,the "Oakes test" is used. 6 6 In addressing the first step of this test in
M. v. H. - whether there is a pressing and substantial objective to the impugned
provision - the government provided an overview of the current legislative provision,
and stated that the objectives of section 29 and the spousal support provisions in Part
III of the FLA are to
remedy the systemic sexual inequality associated with opposite-sex relationships,
including the economic dependence of women on men resulting from women taking on primary responsibility for parenting and from gender-based inequality in
earning power. 67
The government noted that the state has a long history of intervening and imposing
support obligations on opposite-sex spousal relationships. It argued that these relationships require special treatment because of the one-way economic dependence of
one spouse on the other, and because "almost invariably, dependent spouses are
women."'68 The Attorney General also noted that in deciding to enact legislation
providing for support rights and obligations, the Legislature
accepted the conclusion of the Law Reform Commission in 1974-75 that women in
spousal relationships tended to become financially dependent on their male partners
because of the traditional roles of husband and wife. In enacting Part III of the
FLRA, the government recognized and addressed the need of such women for
spousal support.6 9

The government went on to state that when the Legislature decided to extend the
protection of the FLRA in 1978 to common-law partners, the objective of the Act did
not change. Rather, the change reflected the Legislature's concern that women in
common-law relationships were being exploited by their male partners, and that
following the breakdown of the relationship many women ended up dependent on
public benefits. The government argued that, since the legislative objectives of
preventing the exploitation of women by men and of addressing the economic needs
of women applied equally to both common-law and married relationships, the support
70
provisions in the FLRA were extended to common-law couples.
Two other significant arguments were made by the government in outlining the
objective of Part III of the FLA. The first was that despite the gender-neutral definition
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Although it has been refined in more recent cases, the "Oakes test", the standard test all infringements of Charter rights and freedoms must meet, was first formulated by former Chief Justice
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M. v. H., S.C.C., supra note 8 (Factum of the Attorney General, para. 49).
Ibid. at paras. 52, 53.

69.
70.

Ibid. at para. 54.
Ibid. at para. 55.

66.

Peering into the Bedrooms of the Province

in section 29, the Legislature's central objective was to address the effects of women's
economic dependence on men. 7 1 The second argument made was that the "FLA was
not intended to create legal obligations in respect of 'intimate relationships', or to
otherwise provide state support for relationships which involve sexual activity - be it
opposite-sex or same-sex." 72 To do this, the government argued, would mean that the
FLA "could be judicially extended to a wide variety of interdependent relationships
including siblings, friends and others." 7 3 Rather, in describing the second objective
of the Act, the Attorney General argued that the state chose to intervene in opposite-sex
relationships and to describe them alone as spousal because these are the relationships
with the capacity to produce children: "[ilt should be noted that Part III of the FLA
imposes an obligation to support children as well as spouses and parents, and that a
person can become a "spouse" under s.29 precisely because the person is the parent
'7 4
of a child."
In addressing whether section 29 has a pressing and substantial objective, Justice
lacobucci engaged first in a thorough discussion of the purposes of the Act. He began
by examining the Preamble to the Act which, he noted, states
[w]hereas it is desirable to encourage and strengthen the role of the family; and
whereas for that purpose it is necessary to recognize the equal position of spouses as
individuals within marriage and to recognize marriage as a form of partnership; and
whereas in support of such recognition it is necessary to provide in law for the
orderly and equitable settlement of the affairs of the spouses upon the breakdown of
the partnership, and to provide for other mutual obligations in family relationship,
75
including the equitable sharing by parents of responsibility for their children.
Justice Iacobucci determined that, while insightful, the Preamble provided limited
utility. In particular, he found the reference to "marriage" to be "somewhat misleading" given the rights accorded to both married and unmarried couples. He noted too,
citing Legislature of Ontario Debates -from October, 1977, that "the emphasis on
encouraging and strengthening the role of the family is inaccurate as the legislation is
actually intended to deal with the breakup of the family."'76 Instead, Iacobucci J. held
that a more complete and accurate statement of the current FLA's objective was
reflected by the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its Report on the Rights and
Responsibilities of Cohabitantsunder the Family Law Act:
The purpose of the Family Law Act is to provide for the equitable resolution of
economic disputes that arise when intimate relationships between individuals who
have been financially interdependent break down (Parts I-IV). As well, it ensures
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that family members have a means to seek redress when an immediate relative is
injured or killed through the negligence of a third party (Part V).77
It was this statement which Justice Iacobucci adopted as the general objective or
purpose of the FLA.
Having made a determination as to the purposes of the Act generally, Justice Iacobucci
turned to the support provisions of the Act (Part III of the FLA), and in particular,
section 29. Justice lacobucci's analysis here was broken down into two parts: an
analysis of the general legislative objective of Part III and section 29; and an analysis
of the specific legislative objective for excluding or omitting same-sex couples from
these provisions.
After examining the general legislative objective of Part III and section 29, his
Lordship was of the view that the first objective of section 29 put forth by the
government - remedying the systemic inequality associated with opposite-sex relationships - and the submissions made in support of this stated objective, were
"inaccurate". Iacobucci J. stated
[a]lthough I do not dispute the claim that economically dependent heterosexual
women and children are well served by the spousal support provisions in Part III of
the FLA, in my view, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the protection of these groups informs the fundamental legislative objectives behind this part
of the Act.

78

Iacobucci J. noted that while the OLRC had recognized the financial dependence of
many married women upon their husbands, the Commission "encouraged the government to premise support obligations on need and actual dependence rather than on the
assumption that wives are inherently dependent upon their husbands for support
because of the traditional roles assumed by men and women."' 79 In response, the FLRA
introduced a gender-neutral statutory spousal support regime under which a wife or a
husband could oblige the other to pay support.8 0
He also took issue with the government's first stated objective in light of Part III of
the FLA, generally noting that these provisions, which establish the right to receive
support, the obligation to provide it, and the factors courts are to consider in determining the amount and duration of support, use gender-neutral language such as
"dependant", "person", and "spouse" (the latter of which is defined as "either of a man
and woman

... ").

Justice Iacobucci further noted that in establishing the purposes for

an order for support of a spouse, the Act is "silent with respect to the economic
vulnerability of heterosexual women, their tendency to take on primary responsibility
for parenting, the greater earning capacity of men, and systemic sexual inequality."81
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Justice Iacobucci further determined that the government's second stated objective of
the Act - protecting children and ensuring that the conditions under which they are
raised are adequate - was "inconsistent" with the actual terms of the spousal support
provisions provided for in Part III of the Act. He stated
[a]lthough the provisions of Part HI that deal exclusively with child support clearly
reflect these legitimate legislative concerns ...
it seems to me that the spousal
support provisions do not share the same focus. Part Il of the FLA imposes spousal
support obligations on opposite-sex couples irrespective of whether or not they have
children.... [C]ohabiting opposite-sex partners who are not the parents of a child
are expressly included in the s. 29 definition of "spouse" after three years of cohabitation. 82
In the result, Justice Iacobucci adopted the objectives of the provisions as identified
by Madame Justice Charron in her majority decision at the Ontario Court of Appeal
below. Justice Charron had determined that the objectives of the Part III provisions
are to provide a means "for the equitable resolution of economic disputes that arise
when intimate relationships between individuals who have been financially interdependent break down" and to "alleviate the burden on the public purse by shifting
the obligation to provide support for needy persons to those parents and spouses who
have the capacity to provide support to these individuals. ' 83
Having examined the general objectives of Part III generally and section 29 specifically, Justice Iacobucci turned to an examination of the specific legislative objective
for excluding or omitting same-sex couples from section 29. His Lordship stated that
such a specific consideration is important when dealing with underinclusive legislation, as legislation often "does not simply further one goal, but rather strikes a balance
among several goals, some of which may be in tension." 84 He warned that if courts
do not take into account the omission in construing the objective, it is more likely that
the omission will cause the impugned legislation to fail the rational connection step
of the section 1 analysis. Iacobucci J. was quick to point out though that the court does
not have to find that there is a separate objective being furthered by the omission.
Even if there is no such objective the omission must still be evaluated as part of the
means chosen to further the objective of the specific provision in question, under
the proportionality analysis. Otherwise the court risks collapsing the two stages of
the Oakes test (pressing and substantial objective and proportionality) into a general
question regarding the reasonableness of the omission. 85
Here, the government did not argue that a separate objective was furthered by the
omission of same-sex couples from the support provisions, but rather relied on its
earlier arguments that section 29 captured only opposite-sex couples in order to
81.
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provide a remedy for the power imbalance that exists in many opposite-sex relationships, and to ensure the protection of the children of such relationships. Given these
objectives, the exclusion of same-sex partners from section 29 followed naturally
since within the government's paradigm same-sex relationships are not characterized
by the power imbalances that mark many opposite-sex relationships, and no concern
about protecting children arises. Justice Iacobucci disagreed with both of these
justifications, re-stating that he did not believe that the purpose of the FLA in general,
or Part III in particular, is either to remedy the disadvantages suffered by women in
opposite-sex relationships, or primarily to protect children. 86 As such, neither of these
could be the objective for excluding or omitting same-sex partners.
To summarize then, Justice Iacobucci concluded that the impugned provision did have
the pressing and substantial objective of providing a means for the equitable resolution
of economic disputes that arise when relationships between formerly intimate and
financially interdependent individuals break down, and to shift the obligation to
provide support from the public purse to needy persons to those parents and spouses
who have the capacity to provide support to these individuals. However, this objective
was not "plausibly reinterpreted through examining the omission of same-sex
spouses"..8 7
The government's policy reasons for not extending the definition of "spouse" so as to
include same-sex couples are also apparent throughout its arguments with respect to
the rational connection and minimal impairment steps of the Oakes section 1 analysis.
Here the government is required to demonstrate that the effect of the impugned
provision is rationally connected to the legislative objective and that it minimally
impairs the Charterrights in issue. Ontario argued that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the definition of "spouse" in the FLA is rationally connected to the
objective of spousal support in Part III of the Act as the definition imposes support
obligations on those relationships which are characterized by gender-based inequality.8 8 In keeping with this, the government argued that the lack of gender-based
inequality in earning power, "by definition" experienced by gay and lesbian partners,
and the tendency for these relationships to be more egalitarian overall without the
assumption of traditional gender-based stereotypes of bread-winner and home-keeper,
indicated that the law is rationally connected to the objective and to the exclusion of
same-sex couples. 8 9 While the government later acknowledged that one-way economic dependence does occasionally occur in gay and lesbian relationships, or that
such relationships may be financially interdependent, the government stated that
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this was not the aspect of the problem which the legislature viewed as the most
serious or pressing or to which it addressed itself in the reforms of 1978 and 1986.
Following Egan and McKinney, the legislature was entitled to focus on the aspect of
the problem it viewed as most pressing, and to leave it to future legislatures to
address economic dependence in other contexts. 9 0
The government took the position that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
definition of "spouse" also met the rational connection test because of the division of
opinion within the gay and lesbian community regarding the desirability of being
included within a "heterosexual model" of relationships. 9 1 Furthermore, when combined
with the availability of other remedies for individuals in M.'s situation (for instance,
property law and equitable remedies), the government argued that the law "is not so
overinclusive or underinclusive as to be irrational, and that it is also sufficiently tailored
'92
to the objectives of Part III to meet the minimal impairment test."
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the FLA is not rationally connected to the legislative purpose of the Act.
Justice lacobucci stated
I concluded above that the dual objectives put forth by the appellant do not reflect
the true purposes of the spousal support provisions in Part III of the FLA and relied
instead on those set out by the court below. Nevertheless, it seems to me that no
rational connection exists irrespective of which of the objectives is relied upon for
this analysis.
Even if I were to accept that Part III of the Act is meant to address the systemic
sexual inequality associated with opposite-sex relationships, the required nexus
between this objective and the chosen measures is absent in this case. In my view, it
defies logic to suggest that a gender-neutral support system is rationally connected
to the goal of improving the economic circumstances of heterosexual women upon
relationship breakdown. In addition, I can find no evidence to demonstrate that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the spousal support regime of the FLA in any
way furthers the objective of assisting heterosexual women. 93
With respect to the first objective - remedying the systemic inequality associated with
opposite-sex relationships - the Court expressed the opinion that the evidence suggesting that same-sex relationships are more economically egalitarian than oppositesex relationships does not explain why the right to apply for support is limited to
heterosexuals. Justice Iacobucci referred to the submissions of LEAF, an intervenor
in the hearing, and noted that
the infrequency with which members of same-sex relationships find themselves in
circumstances resembling those of many heterosexual women is no different from
heterosexual men who, notwithstanding that they tend to benefit from the gender-
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based division of labour and inequality94of earning power, have as much right to
apply for support as their female partner.
Justice Iacobucci also noted that the right to make a claim for support does not
automatically translate into a support order.95
The majority of the Supreme Court also held that the rational connection test was not
met with respect to the second objective argued by the government, namely protecting
children and ensuring that the conditions under which they are raised are adequate.
Justice Iacobucci stated that even if he accepted that the object of the legislation is the
protection of children, the spousal support provisions are both underinclusive and
overinclusive in their nature. That is, as opposite-sex couples are entitled to apply for
support "irrespective of whether or not they are parents, and regardless of their
reproductive capabilities or desires", the provisions are overinclusive. 9 6 Additionally,
they are underinclusive given the increasing number of children who are being
conceived and raised by gay and lesbian couples. Justice lacobucci noted that while
these numbers are small, if the purpose of the Act is indeed to protect children, this
goal would be "incompletely achieved by denying some children the benefits that flow
from a spousal support award merely because their parents were in a same-sex
relationship." 9 7
In concluding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from section 29 is not rationally
connected to the dual objectives of the spousal support provisions of the FLA identified
by the Attorney General, Justice Iacobucci commented on the irony of the omission
itself, stating that "the inclusion of same-sex couples in s. 29 of the FLA would better
achieve the objectives of the legislation while respecting the Charter rights of
individuals in same-sex relationships." 9 8
As the majority of the Supreme Court determined that the definition of "spouse" in
section 29 of the FLA failed the Oakes test on the basis of no rational connection, it
was unnecessary for the Court to address the minimal impairment or deleterious effects
branches of the Oakes test. However, the Court chose to do so in order to, in Justice
Iacobucci's words, "clarify some fundamental misunderstandings advanced in this
appeal.' 9 9 For the purposes of this paper, it is of interest to examine the Court's
response to the government's arguments as to why its policy reasons and objectives
for not including same-sex couples within the provisions of the FLA met the minimal
impairment test.
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The government argued that because the policy concerns underlying the FLA "are of
critical importance to society", allowing the Legislature to incrementally change the
Act and add new provisions "outweighs any discrimination which may be caused by
leaving out persons or relationships to which the government's central objectives are
much less likely to apply."lO0 In keeping with this, the government submitted that Part
III of the FLA, and section 29 thereof, are relatively recent steps in the province's
approach to spousal support and relied on the argument that the government should
be permitted to change and adjust the legislation slowly and in keeping with society's
needs.
Justice lacobucci disagreed, and instead expressed the view that deference to the
Ontario Legislature in this respect is inappropriate in this case. He noted that while
the Supreme Court has resorted to such an approach where the impugned legislation
involves a balancing of claims of competing groups, such was not the case here.
As no group will be disadvantaged by granting members of same-sex couples
access to the spousal support scheme under the FLA, the notion of deference to
legislative choices in the sense of balancing claims of competing groups has no
application to this case. 101
Justice Iacobucci also noted that a deferential approach is not warranted simply
because some individuals in same-sex relationships, including H. herself, expressed
reservations about being treated as "spouses" in the family law scheme. Iacobucci J.
noted that requiring unanimity among all members of equality-seeking groups with
respect to the desired remedy would make it unlikely that any section 15 claims would
survive section 1 scrutiny. 10 2 Further, deference was not to be accorded simply because
the government argued that Part III of the FLA and section 29 are steps in an
"incremental process of reform of spousal support". Justice lacobucci pointed to the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Vriend v. Alberta wherein the court stated that
"government incrementalism, or the notion that government ought to be accorded time
to amend discriminatory legislation, is generally an inappropriate justification for
Charterviolations."' 103 In response to the government's submissions that the decision
to provide equal status to both sexes under the FLRA, the extension of the rights and
obligations to common-law couples, and the broadening of the definition of "spouse"
by reducing the requisite period of cohabitation from five to three years, were all
significant evidence of incremental progress towards equality, Justice Iacobucci
stated,
I disagree. None of the reforms cited by the appellant has addressed the equal rights
and obligations of individuals in same-sex relationships. In fact, there is no evidence of any progress with respect to this group since the inception of the spousal
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support regime. If the legislature refuses to act so as to evolve towards Charter

compliance then deference as to the timing of reforms loses its raison d'8tre. 104

Finally, the Supreme Court held that the damaging effects caused by the exclusion of
same-sex couples are "numerous and severe", and thus it "cannot be said that the
deleterious effects of the measures are outweighed by the promotion of any laudable
legislative goals, nor by the salutary effects of those measures." 10 5
Falkiner v. Ministry of Community and Social Services
When the "spouse in the house rule" was abolished in 1987 the government stated that
the new definition of "spouse" was formulated in such a way as to be uniform with
the definition in the FLA. However, since 1995 it would appear that this objective has
been deemed no longer necessary. According to the current government's arguments
in the Falkiner case, the former three year period was a "grace period". In the
submissions it filed before the Ontario Divisional Court, the government took the
position that "whether or not there is a spousal relationship is not based on a fixed
time period, but rather a functional test of whether there is evidence of social, familial
and economic interdependence" at any time during the co-residency. 10 6 In both Court
proceedings, the government offered various justifications for this new definition
throughout its facta including in its discussion of the background of the Act. For
instance, as a sort of "preliminary justification", in setting out the history of the Act,
the government stated that the definition allows case workers to give individual
consideration to every co-residency relationship with a person of the opposite sex, in
order to determine if the parties are "spousal" and part of a "family unit". 107 The
Attorney General urged that using the family or spousal unit as the benefit unit was a
logical and reasoned decision, for
[t]he FBA seeks to ensure fair and equitable treatment for all spousal relationships,
whether married or unmarried. The definition of "spouse" in the Regulation prescribes an individualized, functional test for determining whether the relationship is
spousal, based on an assessment of evidence of social, familial and economic interdependence in the relationship. Where a relationship is found to have these characteristics, it is determined to be spousal and it will be treated the same way as a
married relationship for the purposes of social assistance entitlement. 108
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Further, the government stated,
[t]he rationale for using the family unit is that it recognizes that there is a social,
familial and economic interdependence amongst family members. Assets and
income are frequently pooled and economies of scale are enjoyed, especially with
respect to the joint consumption of goods and services. Where there is a family unit,
there may also be more opportunities to work since the couple can share child care
responsibilities.109
Although these introductory statements are helpful in learning the government's
policy position with respect to opposite sex social assistant recipient cohabitees, as in
M v. H., the Attorney General's full position may be seen through its section 1 Charter
analysis of the legislation in question. As its starting point, the government stated that
there are two objectives of the impugned legislation, both of which are "pressing and
substantial". The first objective offered was the desire to "achieve equity between
married couples and couples in common-law relationships that have similar functional
characteristics to those who are married". 110 The government argued that under the
predecessor Regulationcommon-law couples were given an inherently arbitrary three
year grace period before they were treated as a family unit. As many common-law
couples have strong social, familial and economic interdependence immediately upon
living together, the distinction, it was claimed, gave rise to criticisms that common-law
couples were given more favourable treatment under the law than married couples
were.1 11 The government noted, "while one member of the common-law couple could
receive social assistance for three years while living with someone who might have a
good income, a married couple could not." 112 In response to the applicants' argument
that the objective of the predecessor Regulationwas to bring the definition of "spouse"
in the FBA in line with the definition found in the FLA, the government distinguished
the purposes of the two Acts from one another, stating in the second proceeding,
[t]he Family Law Act definition is particularly relevant to post-breakup private
economic arrangements between common-law spouses rather than to the determination of economic interdependence in ongoing relationships. It is based on a uniform,
arbitrary, 3 year time limit rather than on an individualized determination of
whether a relationship is spousal. 13
And arguing in the first proceeding,
[t]he choice of the three-year period under the predecessor Regulation was based on
family law support obligations for common-law couples. Family law support obligations, however, are primarily applicable upon breakdown of the relationship,
rather than during the currency of the relationship. The definition of common-law
spouse for family law purposes is therefore different from the definition of corn-
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mon-law spouse for social assistance purposes. The former addresses the kind of
relationship that should bear an ongoing private support obligation after separation,
while the latter addresses the kind of relationship that should be considered a family
unit for the receipt of public financial support. 1 14
The government took the position that this first purpose is pressing and substantial as
the Supreme Court has recognized the "constitutionally protected right to equal
treatment of married couples and those unmarried couples who are functionally similar
to married couples"." 5
The second objective offered for the new definition was financial in nature and mirrors
the current government's policy of fiscal restraint: the reduction of the cost of social
assistance by accessing private resources, and ensuring that public resources are
allocated to those "most in need". 11 6 As background, the government pointed out that
social assistance has traditionally been provided as last resort funding for persons in
need. However, in recent years, the cost of providing such assistance has been rising
as a result of real rates of assistance, decreases in federal contributions, and increases
in the percentage of Ontario recipients.11 7 The government argued that
[o]ne reason for the increase in the number of those on social assistance was the
amendment of the definition of spouse in 1987, that resulted in the three year
"grace" period in which cohabiting couples were eligible as single persons in the
"three year rule". As of October, 1995, 16% of the total number of sole support
parents was directly attributable to the three year rule definition of spouse that came
into effect in 1987. As a result of this definition, which increased the number of
persons considered single or sole support, the number of sole support parents on
social assistance as a percentage of the total population of single parents in Ontario
was double the average of the other provinces. 118
The government also submitted before the Superior Court that
[o]n the record before the SARB, there were approximately 13,000 social assistance
recipients who were affected by the spousal definition. Approximately 6,947 have
remained entirely off social assistance, and are therefore being supported by private
resources. Approximately 5,000 are now receiving social assistance as a couple.
Only about 815 have reapplied for benefits as single or sole support parents. Some
of these single re-applicants would have become single because of a natural breakdown of the relationship unrelated to the Regulation.
The large proportion of persons who have stayed off social assistance after being
determined to be a spouse under the current definition demonstrates that the spousal
definition is accurately capturing those couples in which private financial resources
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are being shared to support both members of the couple. The vast majority of the
remaining persons who were determined to have a spouse remained in receipt of
social assistance as part of a spousal benefit unit rather than as a single couple.119
In arguing that this second objective was also pressing and substantial, the government
relied on the decision in Ontario (A.G.) v. Pyke, a 1998 decision of the Ontario
Divisional Court which stated
[w]hen the legislation deals with the administration of social assistance to persons
in need (c) [the purpose of assessing the need for assistance appropriately by considering the family unit as a whole and the support obligations of others, along with
individual requirements] comes into play in ensuring that when an applicant for
welfare claims to be in need and entitled to government assistance, he or she is truly
in need in the sense that the applicant does not have alternative means of support
120
otherwise available through other legislative mechanisms.
The SARB determined that the government's second objective, saving public money,
was established. However, the majority stated that it had difficulty accepting the
primary objective, proposed by the Respondents as the "true purpose" of the def'mition. 12 1 In the Board's opinion, "common-law spouses" is not a "term of art with a
clearly delineated meaning". 12 2 The Board stated that it was not persuaded by the
government's argument that the purpose of the legislative is to treat "like as like" for
in its opinion, not all couples who fall within the ambit of the amended definition of
spouse are "equal to" married spouses. In reaching this conclusion, the Board took
note of the fact that married and common-law couples are not treated equally as "the
amended definition of spouse does not tie spousal status to any obligation to provide
financial support."1 2 3 Specifically, the SARB stated
[t]he Respondents' own arguments are that private financial resources are to be
utilized before resort is had to publicly funded social assistance and that this is part
of the reason for amending the spousal definition. Presumably, the reason for treating so-called "common-law spouses" the same as married couples is to ensure that
the private financial resources of both spouses in the common-law relationship are
called upon to provide support before resorting to social assistance....
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In other words, the purpose is to require "common-law spouses" to financially
support each other in the same way that married couples are required to support
each other financially. The difficulty is that the amended definition of spouse does
not tie spousal status to any obligation to provide financial support. 124
The SARB went on to state that it had difficulty understanding why the new definition
removed the "three year rule" from the previous definition if the primary objective
was, as the government contended, to treat "equal" relationships equally. As the new
definition removed the connection with a legal support obligation, the Board found
that "spouses under this definition [are] significantly different from married spouses
... [and] does not support the government's argument that the purpose was to treat all
12 5
'spouses' the same way."
Before going on to consider whether the objective established was "pressing and
substantial", the Board examined what it determined to be a third objective: funding
of last resort. 12 6 Stating that it was prepared to consider this an objective of the
definition, the Board noted, "[p]eople in financial need are required to exhaust other
government financial assistance and private support obligations before they resort to
1 27
social assistance."
Having determined that the government's first stated objective of equality between
married and non-married couples did not actually exist, there was no need for the
Board to determine whether this "non-objective" met the test of pressing and substantial. Further, with respect to the second objective stated by the government, the Board
agreed with the applicants that a concern for cost savings is not a pressing and
substantial concern that could nullify Charterrights. However, the Board did determine that the "second alternative objective", as stated by the Board itself, is a pressing
and substantial concern, as governments must allocate finite financial resources
among competing programs, and thus "must maintain control on spending and ensure
that public funds are spent responsibly." Having thus determined that there did exist
a pressing and substantial objective to the impugned provision, the Board turned to
examine the second step of the Oakes test: whether the means chosen are rationally
connected to the objective found.
One sees that the Ontario government's functional approach to the family is also
apparent in its submissions with respect to this second step. Again, the Attorney
General argued that a "functional test that considers economic, social and familial
factors is appropriate in order to determine whether a spousal relationship [and
presumably family unit] exists." 12 8 The government submitted that
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[t]he use of a family unit as the benefit unit for social assistance purposes is not in
dispute in these proceedings. It ensures that resources available to the family unit
are exhausted before social assistance is provided and consequently, that government resources are directed to those who are truly in need. 129
The government argued that the family unit cannot be exclusively confined to the
realm of married couples because this would fail to recognize the growth of commonlaw relationships. In doing so, the Attorney General down-played the stated desires of
some of the applicants to merely cohabit with, rather than marry, their male companions and thus "test out" a new relationship before making more permanent commitments. The applicants argued that the Regulatory definition, by identifying the
recipient and her co-resident as common-law spouses and a "family unit" immediately
upon cohabitation, did not allow them as social assistance beneficiaries to try out a
new relationship the way that heterosexual, non-social assistance beneficiaries may,
and thus, an unjustifiable distinction was made. In response, the government relied on
some studies which have indicated that cohabitation is not a prerequisite to relation130
ship formation, nor a good indicator of relationship stability or longevity.
The government also argued that the wording of the definition is rationally connected
to the objective of ensuring that financial need is appropriately assessed by first taking
into account available private resources. The Attorney General took the position that
[t]he definition requires an individualized finding of spousal factors, including a
finding that the couple is economically interdependent. The finding of economic
ensures that the definition is capturing those relationships in
interdependence ...
which private resources of each member of the relationship are in fact being made
available to the other.131

The government argued that the means used to achieve the objective are rationally
connected to this objective as the "vast majority of sole support parents who ceased
to be eligible as single persons from the date of the Regulation have either accessed
the private resources available to them, and remained off social assistance, or have
132
requalified with their spouse as a couple."'
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amount of relationship stability, duration, and commitment. The other difficulty with the
government's response is that it skirts the issue and ignores the fact that other Ontario couples are
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The SARB disagreed. Having ruled out the government's two stated objectives, the
SARB examined only the second alternative objective of "last resort". It determined
that
...
since the proposed alternate purpose of the definition is to ensure that private
financial support is accessed before resorting to social assistance, logically, the
definition should relate to private support obligations. In other words, a person
co-residing with someone of the opposite sex should not be ineligible for assistance
based on the definition, unless there is a private support obligation and therefore, a
private financial resource to which the person can turn, instead of public assistance.133
The majority of the SARB was of the view that the removal of the three year rule,
which had "previously tied the former definition of spouse to a private legal support
obligation", was an irrational approach "to achieving what the Board ...
proposed as
the alternative secondary objective of the definition."' 134 In its opinion, waiting to see
if the co-resident would provide financial support to a sole support parent and her
children if social assistance were withdrawn "seems to be throwing the sole support
parent into the water and waiting to see if she will sink, or if the co-resident will throw
out a financiallife line." 135 The SARB noted
[tihe Respondents appear to be saying that a sole support parent can be cut off
benefits based on s. l(1)(d), not because financial support is available nor because
the co-resident is legally obligated to provide support, but because there may be a
"likelihood" that the co-resident will volunteer to financially support the sole support parent and her children. 136
The Board held that a "mere likelihood" of financial support is not a rational basis for
137 It
denying a sole support parent and her children the basic means of subsistence.
also noted that
...
the threshold for a finding of "financial interdependence" is low; far lower than
true financial support. The Board is of the opinion that the definition, at best, may
capture relationships where there is "some possibility" that some amount of financial support might be given at least for some time. At worst, it captures relationships
where no financial support was intended to be assumed nor would any support-be
given. 138
Similar to the Supreme Court in M. v. H., having determined that there was no pressing
and substantial objective to the regulatory definition that was rationally connected to
the means used to achieve the objective, the Board was not obliged to go on and
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consider the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test. However, the Board chose
to consider the government's submissions with respect to this last step, and for the
purposes of this paper, those submissions are very telling.
Before the SARB, the government proposed a modified Oakes test of "reasonableness", and thus did not directly argue minimal impairment. Rather, the government
simply contended that the definition of "spousal unit" in terms of economic, social
and familial characteristics was "reasonable", and provided no further explanation.
Further, they appeared to equate "spousal unit" with "family benefit unit", and argued
that the "family unit" or "family benefit unit" is the appropriate one for social
assistance. Finally, the government argued that the "test" for "spousal unit" in the
Regulations has been endorsed by the judiciary, academics, and some of the witnesses
before the SARB.1 3 9
At the hearing b6fore the Ontario Superior Court, the Attorney General resorted to a
more traditional justification using the familiar Oakes test. The government submitted
that the measure was "carefully tailored" in order to ensure that recipients' rights were
minimally impaired. Further, it argued that the determination of co-residents as
spouses is based on the individuals themselves and the presence of various factors:
"[T]here is no arbitrary distinction based on, for example, the length of time of the
relationship, or whether the parties are married or not." 14 0 Such an assessment, it was
argued, "avoids using presumed group characteristics and stereotypes and provides a
carefully tailored "marker" based on individual circumstances." 14 1 To this end, the
government relied on the decision of Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Canada
(A.G.) v. Mossop wherein she stated that a "functional approach offers distinct
advantages over a more formalistic approach which systematically excludes all but a
42
specific form of relationship." 1
The Attorney General also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Miron v. Trudel
to argue that the applicants' rights were minimally impaired. 143 In Miron v. Trudel,
the Court determined that financial interdependence is a key factor in determining
whether a couple should be considered to be spouses for the purposes of receiving an
accident benefit. The government submitted that social assistance, like the accident
benefits at issue in Miron v. Trudel, is intended to provide day-to-day income support
to a couple in an ongoing relationship.144 The government submitted that "'economic
interdependence' is equally a relevant factor in the context of social assistance" in
determining spousal status as it was in Miron v. Trudel, and argued that with respect to
each of the applicants there was "significant evidence of economic interdependence" 145
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Further, the government argued that the FLA or the former three year "grace" period
should not be considered in assessing whether the Regulatory definition of spouse met
the test for minimal impairment. The government stated that there is "no constitutional
requirement on the government to use the same definition of spouse in all provincial
legislations" and further, that there are "fundamental differences between the purposes
of the definition of spouse in the Family Law Act and the definition in social assistance
legislation."1 4 6 Here the government argued that while in theory the FLA places
spousal support obligations on couples during the currency of their relationship, in
practice, the support provisions are aimed specifically at defining those obligations
that should be imposed on the breakdown of a relationship. "Couples in intact
relationships", the government argued, "are willingly financially interdependent, or
else the relationship breaks up. People in ongoing relationships do not turn to the
Family Law Act to regulate their economic interrelationship." 147 Finally, the government relied again on its argument that the grace period puts unmarried couples in a
better position than married couples, as the latter are assessed as a unit from the date
marriage. 14 8
While it is difficult to speculate on how the SARB would have responded, and how
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice will respond to the government's more traditional
minimal impairment arguments, it is worth noting that the SARB was "not persuaded
that there has been general acceptance by the judiciary, academics and witnesses of
the specific test set out in s. 1(1)(d) of the Regulation".14 9 The SARB noted that while
economic interdependence, and the social and familial dimensions of the relationship,
were accepted as valid factors by witnesses and experts on both sides, there was
disagreement as to whether these were sufficient. Further, the Board stated that in its
view, there was "no evidence of a broad acceptance of what 'economic
interdependence' means nor how much interdependence is 'non-trivial'. The Board is
not satisfied ' that
there is a general acceptance that the impugned definition is
'reasonable'. 1 50 Further, the SARB held that the government failed to address the
question of whether the definition impaired the women's section 15 rights "as little as
reasonably possible", part of its burden under section 1.151
The SARB did consider the traditional Oakes test itself, and determined that the
impugned provision did not satisfy it. Specifically, the Board found that as the
definition of "spouse" catches co-residing couples who expressly do not intend to be
spouses, where they would not otherwise be considered spouses in the province and
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where there is a lack of any financial support obligation between them, the definition
was "overly broad". 15 2 In its opinion
[t]he Board finds that the definition of spouse in s. 1(1)(d) would capture as spouse,
persons who have no legal obligation to provide support to the sole support parent
and her children, and therefore, it is overly broad. A definition of spouse that is
more tailored to capture only those couples where there is a legal support obligation
could, for example, incorporate a three year rule. The three year rule would bring
the definition of spouse in line with the legal support obligations in the Family Law
53

Act.1

The SARB also determined that the definition failed the rational connection branch
of the Oakes test because
[t]he rights of sole support parents on social assistance to personal autonomy in the
choice of their living arrangements and their personal and intimate relationships is
impaired in situations where there is no legal obligation on the co-residents to
financially support each other. This is not a minimal impairment of the equality
154
rights of sole support parents on social assistance.
With respect to whether the section 7 violation due to overbreadth could be saved by
section 1, the SARB relied on the decision of Mr. Justice Cory in R. v. Heywood, where
he stated
[i]n a case where the violation of the principles of fundamental justice is as a result
of overbreadth, it is even more difficult to see how the limit can be justified.
Overbroad legislation which infringes s. 7 of the Charter would appear to be incapable of passing the minimal impairment branch of the s. 1 analysis. 155
Thus, the SARB held that the section 15 and section 7 violations could not be saved
by section 1.
POLICY DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE
As alluded to earlier, at the base of these decisions is not simply the issue of whether
the parties in each case were in a "spousal relationship". Rather, the deeper issues in
each case revolve around who we are willing, and want, to recognize as "spouses",
for what purposes we are willing to recognize them as spouses, and finally, to what
extent we are willing to accept the changing realities of families today. Perhaps the
most frustrating aspects about the differing spousal definitions in the FLA and the
OWA are the extent to which they are inconsistent with one another, and the extent to
which the government is willing to go to justify the "reasons" for the differences. In
each case, the office of the Attorney General, representing the government of Ontario,
gave arguments as to why the definition of "spouse" in each Act was justified. While
152. Ibid.at6l.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
th
155. Ibid. at 62, and R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, 120 D.L.R. (4 ) 348 at 391.
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there was no change in provincial government between the hearing of the two cases,
in each case the government submitted arguments to the courts that not only effectively
contradicted one another and the government's own stated objectives for the legislation in question, but in each case also relied on "tradition" to espouse two significantly
different definitions of the requirements for becoming, or being assumed to be, a
spouse. 156
In both M. v. H. and Falkinerv. Ontario,the government used a functionalist approach
to justify the definition of spouse in the legislation in question. In the context of family
law this approach examines what the institution of a "family", and its component
spouses, do. This approach assumes that a spouse has a certain role, place, and perhaps
consequence, in society, and that it is the goal of the law to address and answer to these
understandings. For the historical functionalist the family is a support unit, both
emotional and financial, within which the husband and wife are assigned particular
traditional societal roles: head of household and breadwinner, and homemaker and
nurturer. The problem with litigators, in this case the government, arguing through
this approach is illustrated in these cases: families, family law, and all of the components traditionally associated with them, are currently developing, changing, being
challenged and consequently becoming redefined. In today's realm of family law there
is simply not a complete, monolithic, or clear agreement as to what a spouse is and
what that person's role is as a spouse. Furthermore, a functionalist approach to law
and policy justification is often criticised on the basis that the goals or roles for society
are not always coherent or consistent. As Katherine O'Donovan points out - and as
the cases amply illustrate - "different pieces of legislation send different messages
because of conflicting aims."1 5 7
In the M. v. H. litigation "spouse" was defined in the FLA and by the government as
opposite-sex couples who are legally married or living common law. One sees the
functionalist approach to families in the arguments of the Attorney General who
submitted that the role or obligation of spouses is to perpetuate the family unit through
procreation, and to provide support for one another and for any resulting children. The
government argued that while gender-neutral, the purpose of Part III of the Act is to
ensure that private support will be provided to "vulnerable, financially dependent
women" in the event of a breakdown in the relationship in order to ensure that the
women did not end up dependent on public benefits. While the Attorney General
stressed that it was not the Legislature's intention that legal rights and obligations
would arise in all economically interdependent relationships, the reality is that if the
156. What is also frustrating about the government's arguments in each case are the inconsistencies
specifically within the s. I Charterjustifications. In each case the Ontario government used policy
arguments to justify the definition of spouse in the particular legislation at issue. However, as we
have seen, while arguing about family life in each case, the "policy" is different in each. Should the
provincial governments be required to have one policy only about "family" (for example)? It is
submitted that they should. However, this is a discussion for another day, and for the purposes of this
paper, what follows is a more general look at the inconsistencies and contradictions in the arguments
presented by the Ontario government.
157. K. Donovan, Family Law Matters (London, England: Pluto Press, 1993) at 20.
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Supreme Court had reversed the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision, women (and men)
in same-sex relationships, upon the break-up of their relationships, would be unable
to legally rely on their former partners for financial support. Many would have no
option but to turn to the public purse.15 8 One sees through M. v. H. that the government
on the one hand was trying to cut back on welfare expenditures by creating a system
in the FLA of private support for former opposite-sex couples, while on the other, was
giving other individuals - gay and lesbian individuals specifically - no alternative
except to turn to social assistance programs. Two observations may be made about the
government's arguments. The first is that by not including same-sex couples in those
whom the FLA both protects and assigns responsibilities and obligations to, the
government was refusing to consider any family other than the "traditional" one of
husband and wife, either with or without children. The second observation, leaving
aside the recent change in the OWA Regulations to include same-sex partners, is that,
ironically, if such individuals had taken in a same-sex roommate to help with expenses,
or had decided to "try-out" a relationship and cohabit with someone of the same sex
in a spouse-like relationship, any social assistance benefits they received under the
OWA would have continued. Given that the OWA definition was broadened in order
to prevent many people from collecting social assistance, and that one of the objectives
for the definition given by the Attorney General for the FLA provisions was to ensure
that women did not turn to public means of support, one would think that a fiscally
driven government would not have to be court ordered to include same-sex couples
within the definition of "spouse" in each Act, but would rather have changed the
definitions without hesitation, in order to ensure that more people would fall under
the realm of eligibility for private support. 159 Instead, the M. v. H. litigation provides
an apt illustration of the extent to which the current Ontario government was willing
to hide behind a definition and philosophy of "spouse" that by only including
heterosexual couples - despite the reality of a growing number of cohabiting gay and
lesbian couples - is at odds with how some families really live.
This lack of reality is illustrated by taking a second look at M.'s situation. If all
references to the parties being women were deleted from the arguments, it is possible
that one could read the case and not know that the parties were in a lesbian relationship.
In every way but for the fact that she was involved in a same-sex relationship, M. met
the criteria for support that the government claimed was considered when the definition of "spouse" was extended to opposite-sex common-law couples: M. was in a
"traditional" role of "primary home-maker" while H. worked outside the home and

158. While it is not possible to accurately assess the total population currently living in same-sex relationships (as many gay and lesbians do not live openly gay or lesbian lives), given the increasing
litigation on "sexual orientation" and for same-sex support and benefit rights, the government's
contention that the numbers of these relationships are too insignificant to legislate for, and that no
former same-sex partners will find themselves on social assistance following a relationship breakdown, is yet another example of the lack of reality in the current government's policy directions.
159. It is interesting to note that British Columbia has recently extended the definition of "spouse" in its
social assistance legislation to include same-sex couples: British Columbia Benefits (Income AssistanceAct), B.C. Reg. 75/97, deposited March 13/97 O.C. 291/97 effective March 31, 1997.
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was the "breadwinner" for the couple; M. did not earn a salary from the business that
she and H. started together; the initial start-up capital for the business came from M.'s
and H.'s own savings; and when the relationship ended, M. was effectively unemployed and without any savings of her own. With these facts in mind, one sees that
the problem with the policy justification and approach of the government in this case
is rooted in the functionalist theory of the family and definition of "spouse" that the
government stands firmly behind. While M. met the criteria of a financially vulnerable
and dependant woman who performed a gender traditional role in a "spouse-like"
relationship, the government was steadfast in its position that family and spouses, and
the consequences associated with being part of a family or being a spouse, are only
found in the traditional, heterosexual family: at base, to the Ontario government, a
family is two spouses, with or without children, living together; a spouse is either of
a man or a woman, a husband or a wife; and spouses support one another (although
generally the husband is assumed to be supporting the wife), either through personal
desire, or legal obligation.
This historical functionalist approach to "family" is well depicted in Mr. Justice
Finlayson's dissenting opinion in M. v. H. at the Ontario Court of Appeal, by Mr.
Justice Gonthier's dissenting opinion in M. v. H, and, as noted above, in the
government's response to the Supreme Court decision. In adopting the Attorney
General's arguments, Justice Gonthier, like Mr. Justice Finlayson dissenting at the
Ontario Court of Appeal, looked at the history of the Act, and concentrated on the
"traditional" family and the roles associated with it: procreation, and generally, wife
as secondary bread-winner and as dependent. 160 Yet, to recognize the need for support
following the breakdown of an interdependent or fully dependent opposite-sex relationship but deny someone support for the sole reason that they were involved in a
relationship which was not in the original Act's considerations, is not only unrealistic
given the changing face and realities of present society, but, as noted above, is
ironically at odds with the government's fiscal policies argued in Falkiner.
The government's steadfast functionalist approach to families and spouses was demonstrated again in the amendments made as a result of the Supreme Court decision in
M. v. H. It is noteworthy that the definition of "spouse" was not extended to include
same-sex partners in the way the Court suggested it should be. Rather, section 29 of
the FLA and the Regulations to the OWA were amended by adding a definition of
"same-sex partner".16 1 In so doing, the government has maintained its refusal to
recognize gay and lesbian couples as "spousal" in the same way that opposite-sex
common-law couples are so recognized.
The problem with using a functionalist approach in order to justify the definition of
"spouse" as heterosexual only is that even in its traditional form the definition no
longer meets the reality of today's society. While it may be argued that spouses still
do have a role in society, it is questionable whether there is a role that can be identified

160. M. v. H., S.C.C., supra note 8 at 654-655.

161. For the revisions to the regulations to the OWA to include "same-sex partner" see supra note 26.
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as "the" role. For instance, many individuals no longer define their family as the
traditional nuclear one; in the majority of households, both spouses work outside the
home; many opposite-sex couples, often through deliberate choice, do not have
children; many women no longer find themselves financially dependent on their
former husbands, particularly if the couple did not have any children; and some men
16 2
find that they are in need of support from their former wives.
What is also problematic about the government's arguments is its plea for judicial
deference to the Legislature's right to amend the FLA how and when it sees fit, and
its primary reliance on the 1974-75 conclusions of the Law Reform Commission. As
noted above, the 1974-75 LRC Report concluded that women are financially dependent on men. The Report thus urged that provisions for support were needed in the
event of relationship breakdown. What is disturbing about the use of the Report in
today's context is the government's unwillingness to look beyond its wording - now
a quarter of a century old - and apply it to today's realities. It is true that in our society
women carry the burden of poverty, that many women are financially dependent on
men, and that the majority of women experience a decrease in material well-being
upon relationship breakdown. 163 However, it may also be true that the feminization
of poverty is not restricted to heterosexual women. Relationship breakdown is not a
heterosexual-only phenomenon; gay and lesbian relationships also end. What is also
disturbing about the Ontario government's position is its argument that the spousal
support provisions in the FLA are "recent" and that when enacted, it was for future
Legislatures to decide how and when to change the provisions in keeping with the
needs of society. 16 4 In fact, the FLRA first recognized common-law spouses when it
was enacted over twenty years ago, while the last change to the definition of "spouse"
occurred fourteen years ago when the FLA was enacted. Thus, the question which
lingers after the government's arguments is: "which 'future' Legislature?" By requiring the Ontario government to recognize these realities, and also the reality that many
same-sex couples differ from many opposite-sex couples only by their gender, and
thus may need, and have a right to, support, the Supreme Court has forced the
government to move the law forward and, in Martha Minow's words, to "connect with
how people really live".
In the Falkiner litigation the government also argued an historical, functionalist
approach to justify the definition of "spouse". Here, the role of the family, and
consequently of the spouses, was again described as a source of support for its
members, with primary reliance on the husband to provide support for the family, only
this time solely for the period that the relationship continued. As in the M. v. H.

162. On this last point, perhaps the most infamous case is Hough v. Hough (1996), 25 R.F.L. (41h ) 319, 30
O.R. (3d) 725 (Ont. Gen. Div.). Although the issue of "need" was questionable, the fact remains that
the court ordered Mrs. Hough to pay spousal support to Mr. Hough.
163. In Moge v. Moge, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, writing for the majority of the S.C.C., took judicial
notice of these realities facing Canadian women today [Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, 99
D.L.R. (4th ) 456 (hereinafter, Moge)].
164. M. v. H., S.C.C., supra note 8 (Factum of the Attorney General at para. 72).

(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy

litigation, the functionalist approach argued by the Attorney General here also
assumed that a family is comprised of a cohabiting husband and a wife and thus
opposite-sex co-residents are a family unit and are responsible for supporting each
other. While the pre-1995 definition of "spouse" had been formulated in such a way
as to be uniform with the FLA definition, the definition at issue in the Falkiner
litigation considered as spousal all opposite-sex co-residents whose relationship was
one of "cohabitation", if financial support was given by either "spouse" to the other,
or if the "spouses" had a "mutual agreement" as to finances. In keeping with its
functionalist arguments, the government argued before the SARB and the Court that
the family unit is the logical and reasonable unit for the purposes of determining
eligibility for social assistance, given that this unit is the "underlying building block
of our society" and as it is the family's function and role to support its members. 16 5
As noted, the government justified the change away from the FLA definition by taking
the position that the three-year "grace period" created an arbitrary and discriminatory
distinction between common-law and married couples. Further, the Attorney General
argued that the objectives of the FLA and the OWA are incompatible because the FLA
provides for support after relationship breakdown and the OWA provides for support
during the relationship. Leaving aside for a moment the issue of a "grace period", the
government's distinction between the FLA and the OWA is, at best, misleading. As
Madame Justice Charron (writing for the majority at the Ontario Court of Appeal in
M. v. H.) pointed out, section 30 of the FLA provides that "[e]very spouse has an
obligation to provide for himself or herself and for the other spouse, in accordance
with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so." ' 16 6 Thus, the obligation
imposed on married and common-law couples under the FLA to provide support for
oneself and for one's spouse arises not only upon break-up, but rather is a continuing
obligation throughout the course of the relationship.
Justice Charron's explanation of the support provisions in her M. v. H. decision shows
the inconsistency with the government's justification for the spousal definition at issue
in Falkiner.In each case, a functionalist argument was used, yet in the FLA, there was
an assumption and requirement of support, and common-law spouses were defined as
three-year, opposite-sex cohabitees; in the OWA there was an assumption of support,
but common-law spouses were defined as opposite-sex cohabitees of any length of
time. As noted above, the definition of "spouse" in the FLA assumed that couples need
time to form spousal relationships and that there should be a certain length of time
before the parties are entitled to the rights and obligations of married couples.
However, under the Regulations to the OWA at issue in Falkiner, the rights and the
obligations of spouses were assigned from the moment that an opposite-sex couple
began residing together. What is perhaps most frustrating about this is that, while a
woman cohabiting with a man would be ineligible for social assistance because of the
"support" she was assumed to be receiving from her "spouse", should this relationship
end before the couple resided together for three years, the "wife" would be unable to

165. Falkiner,Factum of the Attorney General, at para. 17.
166. FLA, s.30, and M. v. H., Ont. C.A., supra note 48 at 148-9.
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claim support from her "husband" under the FLA provisions. Although considered to
be a spouse in one piece of provincial legislation for purposes of financial support,
she would not qualify as a spouse and have access to financial support under another
piece of provincial legislation. The situation remains much the same in the aftermath
of the amendments to the FLA and the Regulations to the OWA introduced as a
consequence of the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in M. v. H. As noted earlier, the
presumption of a spousal relationship immediately upon sharing a dwelling that was
introduced in 1995 has now been repealed. But this by no means eliminates the
inconsistency between the two statutory regimes. The social, familial and financial
aspects of the relationship continue as the test for spousal relationships; there is simply
no longer an automatic presumption at law. The changes will also mean, of course,
that now gay and lesbian couples will be caught in the contradiction. While there may
be cases where it is appropriate to define the same term slightly differently in different
pieces of legislation, it is submitted that where the legislation affects families, whether
directly or indirectly, consistent rather than contradictory meanings not only meet the
requirements of common sense, but may also make the legislation less open to easy
67
attack on constitutional grounds.1
The same reluctance to embrace reality results in internal inconsistencies in the
Falkiner decision. One of the main objectives argued by the government for the
definition of spouse in the OWA Regulations is to cut back on the financial support
being paid out each year through social assistance. To do this, the government
originally broadened the definition of "spouse" to include virtually every oppositesex, co-residing couple with the intention of having these "spouses" support one
another. However, as noted in Falkiner,such actions often backfire: specifically, the
women often end the relationship or seek other housing, and go back to receiving
social assistance. Thus, the goal of fiscal savings is not met.
What is inconsistent with the government's actions here is that the previous definition
of "spouse" may be more conducive to women forming true, desired spousal relationships (remembering that the Falkinerapplicants did not desire to have or consider
their co-habitee a spouse) and thus becoming ineligible for benefits as sole-support
parents under the OWA. Single women and single mothers are among the poorest
groups in the country; the feminization of poverty is now firmly entrenched in
Canadian society. 16 8 As a result of this many women share accommodations, food,
child-caring expenses, and transportation means with friends in order to save
expenses. In fact, living with another person was one recommendation made by the
current Ontario government in 1995 as a means of coping with the massive rate
167. I am not suggesting here that consistency equals constitutionality. A three year or a zero year "grace
period" in each Act may or may not be constitutional. However, in situations such as these which affect so
many individuals and are thus perhaps more noticeable and more controversial, consistency between the
two Acts might have made the legislation less vulnerable to such an obvious s. 15 Charter attack.
168. In Moge, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 examined extensive social science evidence and concluded: "[i]n Canada the feminization of poverty is an entrenched social phenomenon. Between 1971
and 1986 the percentage of poor women found among all women in the country more than doubled":
Moge, supra note 162 at 482.
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cuts. 169 Additionally, many women may rely on male friends to sign or co-sign leases

and loans as many landlords and banks are unwilling to rent or lend money to single
women or mothers on social assistance. Unfortunately, if the man becomes a roommate, even if the roommates are not financially inter-dependent, they will still be
caught by the definition of "spouse" if they are cohabiting and have a mutual
agreement with respect to their finances. 170 This is problematic for many reasons, not
least because
it is hard to imagine that two people sharing accommodation will not have some
financial arrangement and accordingly ... these three categories [in the Regulations]

appear to cover any two people of the opposite sex [now also same sex] living together.
...The plain words of the section "mutual. agreement or arrangement regarding their
financial affairs" would apply to any two persons sharing a residence. 17 1
As the traditional family of the functionalist approach argued by the government
consists of a male and a female sharing quarters and splitting expenses, for the
purposes of the OWA at the time of the litigation, any opposite-sex living arrangement
was assumed to be spousal. 17 2 However, as discussed above and as illustrated by the
applicants in the Falkinercase, this is not necessarily the case in all situations. The
women in the Falkiner litigation asserted that each was living with their male
co-resident on a trial basis. Studies indicate that if these women form long-term
relationships with their male co-residents their standard of living will increase, 17 3 and
the government's desire to get individuals off of the public purse will be met. However,
if the new definitions have the effect of preventing women from entering into
relationships for fear that their benefits will be discontinued, the government's
objective will have failed.
Another reality in today's society that the functionalist approach is at odds with is that
co-residents often do not financially support the women with whom they live. Indeed,
the fact that co-residency often does not mean financial support was one of the factors
which led the Nova Scotia Supreme Court to rule that the Nova Scotia "man in the
house" rule was unjustifiably discriminatory. In Rehberg Justice Kelly noted
[t]he man-in-the-house rule reflects a paradigm where a male residing with a recipient single mother was assumed to be responsible for the care of her and her family.
This assumption, based on a patriarchal model of a family, is now significantly out

169. Falldner,Ont. Div. Ct., supra note 34 at 151-52 per Rosenberg J.
170. Ironically, one sees here that the legislative prohibition precluding investigation into the sexual
relationships between the "spouses" makes it harder for the recipient to rebut the spousal presumption.
171. Falkiner,Ont. Div. Ct., supra note 34 at 142-43 per Rosenberg J.
172. What is interesting in part about the 1995 definition is the unspoken assumption of a sexual relationship between the co-residents. While the requirement of a conjugal relationship has not been present
in the definition of spouse since 1987, the assumption is still there as evidenced by the government's
insistence that co-residents of any time-length are "common-law" and by the government's comparison of the co-residents to married couples.
173. Again, this phenome-non was noted by Justice L'Heureux-Dub in Moge, supra note 162.
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of touch with a current model of the family as perceived in most family and divorce
174
legislation and legal authority.

By taking the position in Falkinerit has, the government missed this point; it is unable
to step out of the paradigm and see past the historical, functional approach to the
assumptions of the roles and responsibilities of opposite-sex co-residents. As Katherine O'Donovan points out, such a narrow approach of functionalism to the roles of
family members has been widely criticised. Functionalism as a moral theory she notes,
"is sexist in its beliefs and assumptions. Social stability is emphasised, with rules and
175
norms internalised, and women's role defined in certain terms."
Finally, employing a functionalist approach to justify the definition of spouse ignores
the reality that many couples decide to move in together precisely because they do not
yet know if they are compatible as partners or spouses, and because dating alone often
does not provide a fair assessment. In Rehberg, Justice Kelly accepted the evidence
of expert witnesses about the importance of this trial period and stated that
the opportunity for a man to interact with the single mother and her children in the
stresses of their normal home environment, is an extremely important opportunity
for a single mother to assess the suitability of a male friend for a long-term relationship. [S]tep-parenting is one of the most difficult kinds of relationships to develop
and cohabitation would give all parties involved, the single mother, her male friend,
and the children an opportunity to assess if an appropriate long-term relationship
could develop. [A] conventional dating relationship in such circumstances is usually
artificial and inadequate to assess the potential for a healthy relationship for all
parties. 176
In Falkiner,the applicants all expressed the desire to try out the relationship they were
in, before making a decision on whether or not they wanted to commit to a long-term
serious relationship. This wish was not frivolous: the women had each been abused
by men in the past, and each woman was worried about the compatibility between
herself, her children, and the male friend. 177 However, the traditional approach to the
family as argued by the government in this case, and the government's desire to treat
cohabiting opposite-sex persons equally to married couples does not conceive of
co-habitational try-out periods. Rather, it perceives conventional dating, followed by
174. R. v. Rehberg (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th)336, 127 N.S.R. (2d) 331 (N.S.S.C.), at 351 (hereinafter,
"Rehberg"). Notice of Appeal filed in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Court File number CAC
02977. What is ironic about this decision is that Justice Kelly used the Ontario pre-1995 definition of
"spouse" as an example of a system that had effectively moved away from the discriminatory
practise of the "spouse in the house" rule (at 353).
175. Supra note 156 at 20.
176. Rehberg, supra note 173 at 353.
177. As Little and Morrison note, "The prevalence of violence in the lives of low income single mothers
is not often fully acknowledged", supra note 27 at footnote 60. K. Rodgers has noted that approximately half of all Canadian women have been the victim of a serious assault and the statistics are
even higher for women with lower incomes: K. Rodgers, "Wife Assault: The Findings of a National
Survey," Juristat, No. 9, Vol. 14, 1994, reporting on the 1993 Statistics Canada Violence Against
Women Survey.
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co-habitation, as an indication of a long-term relationship. Functionalism assumes that
when co-habitation begins certain roles are taken on. However, today's relationships
are not always able to be pigeon-holed into roles, particularly when these roles include
assumptions of support obligations. Further, the difficulty with the government's
"objective" of equality is that it begs the question. As Little and Morrison point out,
to be able to treat these individuals the same as married couples, "one must first be
able to say what defines a married couple ...[unfortunately] the only common
characteristic of married couple is that they are married." 17 8 Little and Morrison go
on to note
is that it can only claim
[t]he fundamental paradox of the new definition [1995] ...
to be treating "common-law" couples the same as married couples by ignoring the
profound ambiguity in the very areas it has chosen to make the comparisons. Married couples - and those people defined as spouses in clauses (a) to (c) of the
definition - either have voluntarily chosen to pool finances or have a mutual support obligation imposed by law. People who fall within clause (d) have no legal
support obligation to each other. ... Although the government has argued vigorously
that the 1995 changes replaced an "arbitrary" rule with a "functional" definition of
what it means to be a couple, in fact its functional definition can only operate by
deliberately ignoring this divergence. 179
CONCLUSION
It has now been over twenty years since former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared
that the state has no business in the bedrooms of the Nation. However, despite this
proclamation, the government does in fact have a say in, and continues to affect, our
most intimate relations. While homosexuality is no longer a criminal offence, and
common-law couples are now legally recognized and protected, by deciding who is
and is not a "spouse", the Ontario government is indeed peering into the bedrooms of
its constituents and making moral decisions on the public's behalf. These decisions,
ironically, are often to the detriment of everyone involved, including the government.
The cases of M. v. H. and Falkinerv. Ontario and the laws that the parties challenged,
clearly demonstrate the downside of the government's intervention, or its lack thereof.
By broadening the definition of "spouse" in the Regulations to the OWA in 1995, the
Ontario government argues that it has "caught" thousands of people and has saved
millions of dollars previously "given out" through social assistance programs in the
province. However, most of those caught are women, often single mothers, who are
struggling to make ends meet. Although the definition of "spouse" in the Regulations
is gender neutral on its face, as Little and Morrison point out, "its impact is felt
disproportionately by low income mothers seeking assistance as sole support parents." 1 80 In fact, over 90 per cent of sole support parent families receiving social

178. Little and Morrison, supra note 27 at 134.
179. Ibid. at 25.
180. Ibid. at 4.
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assistance in Ontario are headed by women.181 The definition unwarrantably made
many ineligible for assistance because their "spouse" - an opposite-sex co-resident was deemed to be responsible for financially assisting them. While this objective
might be worthy on its face the reality, as the Falkinercase demonstrates, is that many
of the co-residents do not financially assist OWA recipients, and many women are
choosing either to end their co-residencies, or simply not to enter them at all. The
ramifications of the government's lack of intervention is aptly illustrated in the M. v.
H. decision. By refusing to broaden the definition of "spouse" in the FLA until ordered
to do so by the Supreme Court, the provincial government barred all gays and lesbians
from being legally entitled to support from their former partners, and thus not only
put off the political "hot potato" of homosexual relationships and gay and lesbian
rights but also potentially forced many former same-sex partners to turn to the social
assistance programs for support. 182
In each of these cases, and with each of these Acts, a moral choice has indubitably
been made. Among the priorities of the current provincial government are fiscal
restraint and cutbacks. Welfare recipients are an easy target for many people particularly when they are portrayed, as the government did in the Falkinerlitigation, as
freeloaders or as not needing support because of other available and familial means
of assistance. Additionally, while sexual orientation may now be recognized as a
prohibited ground of discrimination under the Charterand in (most) Human Rights
Codes across Canada, many people, and additionally the current Ontario government,
remain uneasy with the legal recognition of same-sex relations. The problem with the
government's approaches to these issues is the inconsistencies within them. As
illustrated above, the provincial government argued for two different definitions of
"spouse" in two different statutes in order to meet its own policy objectives: fiscal
restraint, and traditional, heterosexual, family life. As also illustrated above, on closer
examination the differing definitions simply cannot be supported in light of the
government's stated objectives: in each Act the definitions and the objectives for them
internally collapse upon themselves.

181. Ibid.
182. "Hot potato" is a particularly interesting phrase to use in the context of the current, Conservative
government. Martha A. McCarthy, M.'s lawyer, used it during her submissions to the S.C.C. in order
to describe the actions of the current government and its desire to side-step the issues surrounding
homosexuality and sexual orientation. Ms. McCarthy noted that throughout the government's s.l
arguments, the Attorney General pleaded for judicial deference to the Legislature in order to incrementally change the protections afforded and those recognized in the FLA. However, during the
government's s.24(l) remedy submission, the Attorney General requested that if the S.C.C. found
that s.29 of the FLA unjustifiably infringed s.15(l) of the Charter,that the Court read "sexual
orientation" into the Act. This inconsistency and request, Ms. McCarthy suggested, was a further
indicator of the government's desire to not address the issue of sexual orientation and family law.
The government would rather be "forced" to read sexual orientation into the Act, than to be seen as
willingly doing the same [Submissions of Martha A. McCarthy, S.C.C. Appeal of M. v. H., heard
March 18, 1998. It should be noted that this is a paraphrase and interpretation by the author of Ms.
McCarthy's submissions to the Court and her responses to the questions asked of her. It is not meant
to be and should not be taken as a direct quote of Ms. McCarthy's submissions].
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In both M. v. H. and Falkiner v. Ontario,the government's arguments in support of
the definitions at issue may be seen as classically functionalist. While there are many
benefits to 'traditional' family life, and while families and their components do indeed
continue to play roles in society, it is highly questionable whether there is one role of
the family or one definition of who is a spouse that can be reconciled with the realities
of today's changing world. In light of the evolving nature of families in our society
today, governments must respect, adapt and change when legislating in this area of
profound importance in each of our lives. To do so is to make family law truly
"connect" with how we live. To deny these realities is to engage in obstinate deception.

